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Fem-nomenology
“Without Bodies #3” by Jessica Bandy
By Deborah A.Z. Streahle
moral and practical issues concerning the body, particularly ones 
relevant to women, have had little place in philosophical discus-
sion. By analyzing the body’s role in existence, phenomenology—
particularly Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical contributions—
gives feminists the tools to explore these historically neglected 
issues. Two compelling examples provide frameworks for under-
standing femininity and the body. By incorporating the lived body 
at the foundational level, feminists can encourage philosophical 
discourse to move beyond the limits of mind-body dualism.
 The body is a historically neglected entity, often to the particular detriment of  women. In the tradition of  his phenomenologist predecessors, Merleau-
Ponty elucidates a philosophical approach 
that attempts to eliminate the mind-body 
distinction, resulting in a more convincing 
and holistic picture of  the self. The purpose 
of  this paper is to show how feminism stands 
to benefit from phenomenology. First I will 
discuss how the body is traditionally over-
looked in the Western tradition. Then I will 
cover general ways in which Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological approach expands our 
understanding of  persons in ways that are 
relevant to feminists. Next I will introduce Iris 
Marion Young’s essay, “Throwing Like a Girl,” 
as an example of  phenomenology’s ability to 
shed light on important and often ignored 
issues, despite Dianne Chisholm’s criticisms.2 
I conclude that a feminist philosophy will be 
increasingly inclusive if  it adopts and explores 
phenomenology in the way both Young and 
Chisholm successfully do. 
The Neglected Body
Philosophical conversations presupposing 
a mind-body dualism can be traced back to 
Plato’s era. The traditional dualist picture of  
the self  parallels the separation between the 
spiritual and material worlds. This has been the 
dominant ontology throughout the modern 
philosophical period. This duality often privi-
leges the mind over the body and locates the 
self  as primarily in the mind. As a result, the 
body is seen as in opposition to and subordi-
nate to the mind.3 The body is often associated 
with limitations—illness, mystery, and unend-
ing desire.4 Conceived as both a problem and 
as an entity separate from the mind, philoso-
phy has neglected to focus on the body as a 
legitimate locus for understanding the self. 
The body also has a gendered history: 
“women, besides having bodies, are also as-
sociated with the body, which has always been 
considered woman’s “sphere” in family life, 
in mythology, in scientific, philosophical, and 
religious ideology.”5 Consequentially, moral 
and practical issues concerning the body, 
particularly ones relevant to women, have had 
little philosophical place for discussion.6 Is-
sues such as abortion, pornography, domes-
tic violence, eating disorders, and physical 
disabilities are all subordinate to concerns of  
the mind—truth, knowledge, morality, etc. In 
addition, when women are associated with the 
weak and limiting body, how can philosophy 
take women’s theorizing seriously? There is 
evidence that mind-body dualism is some-
what responsible for the historical absence of  
women in the field. 
The implications of  this oversight are 
extensive. Although philosophy has recog-
nized the body’s role in existence, mind-body 
dualism has reduced its importance and thus 
estranged it from the tradition. Embodiment 
is an essential aspect of  human existence and 
“The world is not what I think, but what I live through.”
-Maurice Merleau-Ponty1
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overlooking its relevance to philosophy results 
in a distinctly detached method of  theorizing 
in philosophy that has provided a limited pic-
ture of  the world. This detachment continues 
to emphasize an exclusive and harmful intel-
lectualism. The philosophical majority position 
not only excludes alternative viewpoints, it 
leaves a lasting mark on the body—repressed 
bodies express their exclusion and silence in a 
number of  hurtful ways. 
Phenomenal Benefits
The study of  phenomenology, particularly 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s contributions, has 
the potential to overcome the metaphysical 
oversight of  the body’s relevance and thus, 
include women and their bodies in the philo-
sophical tradition. In Phenomenology of  Perception 
Merleau-Ponty provides a theoretical frame-
work that emphasizes embodied characteris-
tics as vital to personhood and agency. I will 
briefly discuss aspects of  his theory that are 
relevant to feminist philosophy.7 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology begins 
with lived experience. He is concerned with 
how individuals perceive the world. For him, 
embodiment is a fundamental aspect of  expe-
rience. The self  is a lived body experienced in 
immanence and transcendence—as a unique 
self  and as able to extend beyond itself  in 
relation to the world. Consciousness and em-
bodiment are inseparable; consciousness in-
forms the body as much as the body informs 
conscious thought: “rather than a mind and a 
body, man is a mind with a body, a being who 
can only get to the truth of  things because its 
body is, as it were, embedded in those things.”8 
In this way, mind-body dualism is minimized 
in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology.
The concept of  the self  as embedded in 
the world is vital to Merleau-Ponty’s theory. 
Our basic presence is a self-awareness of  
consciousness and physicality that informs 
our body image. Merleau-Ponty describes the 
lived body as an agent that is able to orient 
itself  towards other things in multiple possible 
ways. The self  is “subtended by an ‘intentional 
arc’ which projects round about us our past, 
our future, our human setting, our physi-
cal, ideological and moral situation, or rather 
which results in our being situated in all these 
respects.”9 Our actions depend on our rela-
tionships to things in our environment, which 
we perceive through our potential intention to 
interact with objects. Objects are inseparable 
from the intentional meaning we give them. In 
this way the self  is transcendent—it extends 
requires self-awareness, but also an ability 
to relate to the world, to transcend the self  
by imagining oneself  in a variety of  possible 
interactions with the world. The body both 
experiences immanence and transcendence. 
This picture of  us is a much better reflec-
tion of  humans as agents in the world than 
what mind-body dualism describes because it 
accounts for a dialogue between the physi-
break down a barrier for women in philosophy, 
and provides philosophical information about 
gendered and sexed bodily experience. 
As Young notes, the “feminine” is a histori-
cally and culturally constructed term. Histori-
cally in literature, philosophy, medicine, and 
everyday life, people referred to femininity 
as a categorical catch-all for all unexplain-
able aspects of  women’s lives. As a result, the 
few accounts of  what it is like to be a woman 
have been viewed through the singular lens 
of  femininity—unique characteristics, stories, 
medical conditions all fell under this label. 
What constitutes the feminine has not been the 
domain of  philosophy, and if  it has, it has usu-
ally excluded women from the writing of  their 
own history and analysis. Considering the asso-
ciation of  the body with weakness and women 
with the body, it is not surprising that “femi-
nine,” a term normally designated for women, 
represents a somewhat lacking experience. 
The feminine, for Young, is not something 
biologically determined. Young views feminin-
ity as an inhibited style of  existence, opposed 
to the freedom and openness of  the masculine 
style. Young’s essay explores basic modalities 
of  feminine embodiment with the goal of  de-
mystifying the femininity expressed by women 
in a “contemporary advanced industrial, urban, 
and commercial society.”13 In her examples, 
Young concentrates on particular actions that 
involve the whole body as it seeks to complete 
particular tasks, such as throwing a ball, be-
cause these actions provide the best instances 
for a phenomenological account. Femininity is 
a style of  behavior expressed by most Western 
women but not all. Citing de Beauvoir, Young 
argues, “Every human existence is defined 
by its situation; the particular existence of  the 
female person is no less defined by the histori-
cal, cultural, social, and economic limits of  her 
situation.”14 However, in the same paragraph 
Young also recognizes women as unified by 
something “specific to a particular social for-
mation during a particular historical epoch.”15 
By acknowledging both difference and unity 
among women, Young builds a strong founda-
tion for her phenomenological analysis. 
Young diagnoses feminine inhibition as a 
“tension between immanence and transcen-
dence.”16 Merleau-Ponty discusses immanence 
and transcendence through his description of  
the self  as a “pure presence” that is connected 
to one’s environment, which one sees as an 
extension of  possible avenues for the self.17 
He describes a sense of  wholeness, knowledge 
of  one’s body, and a sense of  free interaction 
with the world that Young argues the feminine 
actor lacks. Women have a hesitating sense of  
flow and interaction with the world because 
they are constantly self-aware of  themselves 
as objects. They cancel the possibility of  com-
pleting a task before they even start it. There 
is a realm of  possibility, but it is disconnected 
What constitutes the feminine has not been the 
domain of philosophy, and if it has, it has usually 
excluded women from the writing of their own 
history and analysis.
beyond as a unique boundary, as a border and 
as a link to the world. Here Merleau-Ponty’s 
illustrates his theory: 
There is my arm seen as sustaining familiar 
acts, my body as giving rise to determinate 
action having a field or scope known to me 
in advance, there are my surroundings as a 
collection of  possible points upon which 
this bodily action may operate,—and there 
is, furthermore, my arm as a mechanism 
of  muscles and bones, as a contrivance for 
bending and stretching, as an articulated 
object, the world as pure spectacle into 
which I am not absorbed, but which I con-
template and point out.10 
As shown, the self  is more than the sum of  its 
parts; its consciousness and physicality are ac-
counted for as part of  the whole. The environ-
ment is the known relational space and a do-
main of  potentiality through which the body 
acts. The self  is integrated into its environ-
ment in both conscious and physical ways. The 
arm acts on behalf  of  the whole self  as an 
arm in motion reflecting the “acquired worlds” 
of  motile memory.11 It is a physical extension 
of  the body’s “attitude directed towards a 
certain existing or possible task.”12 There is a 
balance between (what traditional philosophers 
see as) the mind and the body. The lived body 
cal and the mental. Some theories of  mind-
body dualism cannot explain the relationship 
between mind, body, self  and world. This is a 
problem for understanding the self  as a per-
son and as an actor. Merleau-Ponty’s phenom-
enology illustrates a theory of  the self  that is 
holistic rather than piecemeal. His focus on 
the lived body restores the body to its right-
ful position in philosophy. His contribution 
to phenomenology is beneficial for feminist 
philosophers because it helps feminists analyze 
a culture that emphasizes difference based 
aspects of  our bodies. This is particularly 
refreshing for those who find no place for 
women’s issues in traditional theories. I will 
discuss this in more detail in the next section.
Feminist Phenomenology 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological empha-
sis on analyzing the body’s role in existence 
gives feminists the tools to explore historically 
neglected issues of  the body. Iris M. Young’s 
essay, “Throwing Like a Girl,” builds on 
Merleau-Ponty’s and Simone de Beauvoir’s ac-
counts of  phenomenology in order to address 
the feminine. Young’s account is an example of  
how phenomenology can lead to philosophical 
discussion of  women’s issues. By describing 
the feminine phenomenologically, Young helps 
“Without Bodies #6” by Jessica Bandy
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from the self, it is someone else’s possibil-
ity.18 With an inhibited sense of  intentional-
ity and ambiguous transcendence, feminine 
motion contradicts itself  and thus, actions 
are completed hesitatingly. The body is stuck 
in immanence, and only partially extended in 
transcendence; neither is fully expressed and a 
balance is not achieved. 
Young further argues that, as a result of  
occupying an unbalanced space between im-
manence and transcendence, the self  is seen as 
both a subject and object, both looked at and 
acted upon.19 Action is perceived as happening 
to them, and not as an engaging activity. The 
feminine body has a disrupted sense of  unity 
because the body is seen in parts, and motion is 
seen as carried out in these parts discretely, rath-
er than as a part of  a whole. They live as objects 
instead of  lived bodies, feeling segregated from 
their environment and disconnected from the 
potential avenues of  action surrounding them. 
Historically used as a tool for masculine goals, 
the feminine body lacks a sense of  control over 
itself. They see themselves in the mind-body 
dualist tradition—as having minds and having 
bodies, but not as a whole self  with uninhibited 
agency. Instead their agency is thwarted. 
Young’s discussion of  space also exempli-
fies the notion of  the inhibited feminine body. 
Feminine women tend to act in an enclosed 
space, with a feeling of  the self ’s space and 
the space of  the action as separate, and are 
stuck in a particular space. Young cites numer-
ous examples to support this: the use of  only 
some of  the body to complete a physical task, 
recoiling in fear of  getting hurt (the feminine 
as fragile), receiving an action rather than en-
gaging with it, acting within a small protected 
space, hyper-self-awareness, the worry of  
appearing awkward or too strong, perception 
of  the self  as weak, low expectations and thus 
lack of  effort, lack of  self-trust, lack of  prac-
tice performing tasks.20 The tension between 
immanence and transcendence, along with con-
ceptions of  space particular to women, provide 
compelling philosophical descriptions of  the 
empirical characteristics of  many women. 
A Critique
Young’s account of  the feminine, though use-
ful, does not stand unchallenged. In her essay, 
“Climbing Like a Girl,” Dianne Chisholm 
argues that Young’s characterization of  the 
feminine does not accommodate change and 
difference in the expression of  femininity over 
the years since Young first wrote her essay in 
1980.21 Chisholm argues that Young presents 
the feminine through “a restrictive history that 
fails to account for the phenomenology of  
their ‘ascendance’ in new realms of  freedom 
and existence.”22 Chisholm argues that the 
femininity Young describes does not typify “all 
women at all times” and that Young’s “femi-
nine” is presented unfairly as something in 
strict contrast to masculinity, dictated by it.23 
Chisholm is not looking to prove society has 
overcome its gender biases, rather she attempts 
to show women’s bodily interactions have 
ascended to a degree since Young’s essay, and 
that performing an action “like a girl” does not 
have to be synonymous with inhibition.
Chisholm focuses on the case of  Lynn Hill, 
a professional climber. According to Chisholm, 
hill transcends gender constraints by climbing 
in her own distinct way specific to her smaller, 
“feminine” build. Chisholm uses Hill as a 
counter example to Young’s description of  the 
feminine, and as an example of  what women 
“can do beyond embodying gender”:24 “Hill 
exemplifies, above all, how she or any woman 
can climb like a girl most capably and adven-
turously without endorsing and performing 
femininity (or masculinity) even as she lives in a 
hyper-masculinized world.”25 Chisholm’s point is 
that Hill’s lived body extends beyond traditional 
femininity, while still exemplifying characteristics 
of  a girl. Chisholm does not clearly describe the 
difference between “like a girl” and “feminine”; 
however, it seems Chisholm means climbing 
like a girl is a style not able to be categorized as 
feminine or masculine, yet one that still ac-
knowledges gender difference. Hill climbs like a 
girl, using the characteristics of  her sexed body, 
in contrast to her masculine fellow climbers. 
Where men are forceful, she treads more care-
fully. Instead of  following the male lead, she 
and other women climb in an opposing manner 
more individually suited to their bodies. Her 
embodiment is not limited. Hill experiences free, 
balanced transcendence and immanence. 
As a very successful free climber, Hill stands 
as an example of  the possibility that women 
can achieve unrestrained motility by overcom-
ing the feminine. The strength of  Chisholm’s 
essay is that the term feminine may not only 
come to express uninhibited unity and motility, 
and thus extend beyond the negative histori-
cal meaning that Young describes, but that the 
term feminine could eventually be abandoned. 
Chisholm argues that women can learn to 
climb like a girl, or do anything like a girl, with-
out exemplifying femininity. It is the term fem-
inine itself, not the women who exemplify it, 
that is inherently limited. To describe only two 
possibilities, masculine and feminine, is to ig-
nore others and those in between. It seems the 
typical meaning of  feminine has not changed 
drastically since Young’s essay was published. 
Young’s description still resonates women, 
particularly college-age ones, as she notes in 
her follow-up essay, “Throwing Like a Girl: 
Twenty Years Later.”26 Not only do women 
still feel and act in the inhibited manner Young 
describes, popular culture via media echo and 
reinforce her phenomenological account of  
femininity.27 Like the problem of  mind-body 
dualism, gender dualism is equally destructive. 
The feminine cannot disentangle itself  from 
history. But it is possible to transcend it in a 
way similar to Chisholm’s example.
Where Young describes the current situa-
tion, Chisholm imagines the future based on a 
current example. She argues that not only can 
we re-appropriate the feminine for positive 
meaning, but also that women can transcend 
is a way we are currently situated in society. 
Recognizing the limitations of  gender is vital 
in a tradition where gender has been a cause 
of  prejudice. Her discussion proves the benefit 
of  phenomenology in uncovering and explain-
ing issues of  women’s concern. 
Phenomenology is in the process of  re-
shaping feminists’ philosophical foundations. 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology has encour-
aged both Chisholm’s and Young’s discussions 
of  an observable style of  behavior in women 
on the philosophical level. Both feminist ap-
proaches to phenomenology have been useful 
in strengthening feminist goals in different 
ways. Though conflicting at some points, both 
accounts give a philosophical place and voice 
to women’s bodies. Feminist philosophy has 
already benefited from their adoption and ad-
aptation of  phenomenology. By incorporating 
the lived body at the foundational level, femi-
nists will perhaps be able to further general 
philosophical discourse that has been limited 
by mind-body dualism. Theories of  moral 
Women have the ability to reshape their style,  
to individualize their movement and resituate 
themselves as freely engaged beings in the world.
a limiting view of  gender and still be women. 
Women have the ability to reshape their style, 
to individualize their movement and resitu-
ate themselves as freely engaged beings in the 
world. Femininity might always be associated 
with a constrained picture of  motility; there-
fore, women must overcome the category. 
There is room for moving beyond feminine.
On some phenomenological level it is pos-
sible to abstract to a level where people are 
people, rather than gendered and sexed beings. 
Young has built on Merleau-Ponty’s less explic-
itly gendered theory to demonstrate concrete 
examples of  women’s historical subjugation 
through analysis of  their bodies in relation to 
action. Young focuses on the gendered body 
in her phenomenological account because this 
justification, for instance, are problematic in 
part because of  their ignorance of  the body. 
Working in a phenomenological context, femi-
nists can work to achieve a more accountable 
ethical system and provide a more accurate 
reflection of  people as actors in the world.
As shown here, matters of  the body have 
a lasting impact on theories of  experience. 
Developing a philosophical approach to ac-
count for the body’s role is vital. Disembodied 
theorizing can only provide an incomplete 
picture of  us as actors in the world. Phenome-
nology helps achieves important feminist goals 
by accommodating a multiplicity of  experi-
ences. Merleau-Ponty’s account moves beyond 
mind-body dualism and forges an avenue for 
discussion where none existed before.
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